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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES D. NIELSEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
CaseNo.20010510-SC
vs.
GOLD'S GYM and TROY PETERSON
& ASSOCIATES,
Defendants-Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
The Judgment of Dismissal was entered May 11, 200L (R. 151-149). The 30 day
deadline for appeal (Utah R. App. P. 4(a)) fell on June 10, a Sunday. Plaintiff filed his
Notice of Appeal on the following business day, June 11, 2001 (R. 156-155.) The appeal
was timely. Utah R. App. P. 22(a). Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996), because the appeal is one over which the Court of Appeals does
not have original jurisdiction.

ISSUE PRESENTED
Was a lease for "the premises" located at a strip mall ambiguous as to whether "the
premises" included substantial interior improvements not yet even designed nor under

construction, and which would need to be custom designed for that particular tenant, and was
the lease therefore unenforceable for lack of mutual assent? Whether a contract is ambiguous
is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. CrooL 980 P.2d
685,686 (Utah 1999). This issue is the main focus of the trial court's Ruling. (R. 120-113.)
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Appellant does not contend that there are constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the case. This is an appeal from a final judgment in a civil action for

breach of a real estate lease agreement.
B.

Course of proceedings and disposition below.

Plaintiff filed his Verified Complaint on August 25, 1998. (R. 8-1.1) Plaintiff filed
an Amended Complaint on August 21,2000. (R. 72-64.) The case was tried to the bench
on December 12,2000. (R. 88-87.) On January 24,2001, the court issued its ruling finding
that plaintiff had not sustained his burden. (R. 120-113.) The formal Findings of Fact and

!

The documents in the trial court record are organized in reverse chronological order, with
the result that the numbering placed on the documents pursuant to Rule 11(b) of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure runs in reverse order on each document.
2

Conclusions of Law (R. 148-143) and a Judgment of Dismissal (R. 151-149) were entered
May 11,2001.
Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal on June 11, 2001. (R. 156-155.)

C.

Statement of Facts.

James Nielsen undertook to construct and develop a strip mall at approximately 1340
East Center Street in Spanish Fork, Utah. (Tr. 16, 28-29, 79.) During the construction,
Nielsen placed signs on the building advertising it for lease. (Tr. 16.) Troy Peterson, the
manager for Gold's Gym (Tr. 96), contacted Nielsen and expressed interest in leasing a
portion of the property. (Tr. 97,16.)
At the time of Peterson's initial contact with Nielsen, the zoning on the property did
not permit the construction of a health club. (Tr. 30.) In order to seek a zoning change,
Nielsen explained to Peterson that he needed to have a lease in place to show that Peterson
was serious in his desire for the property. (Tr. 32,99.) Nielsen obtained a preprinted lease
form at a business store, attached an addendum, and presented it to Peterson, who signed the
document. (Tr. 33, 67, 100.) The addendum attached to the lease stated the lease was
subject to the zoning being changed from C-l to C-2. (Exhibit 1.) Nielsen obtained the
necessary zoning change on October 21, 1997. (Tr. 13.) The lease stated the lease term
would begin November 1, 1997. (Ex. 1.)

3

On August 18, 1997, when the lease was signed, the premises were not ready for
occupancy, but the construction had progressed to the point where Peterson could have begun
installing tenant improvements. (Tr. 37,39.) Because of the possibility that some plumbing
and electrical wiring might need to be placed in the concrete floor, the contractor
constructing the building shell delayed finishing the floor so the improvements could be
placed in the floor. (Tr. 80.) Although the shell was not totally completed by November 1,
the date ofpossession under the lease, it was ready for tenant improvements on that date. (Tr.
80.)
After signing the lease, Peterson asked Nielsen for the name of someone who could
design and build the interior. Nielsen put Peterson in contact with Buck Robinson, the
contractor who was building the shell. Robinson, in turn, referred Peterson to John Rather,
an architect. (Tr. 18.) Peterson met with Rather at the construction site in Spanish Fork and
gave directions as to what he wanted in his gymnasium. (Tr. 74.) Rather prepared a set of
architectural plans and delivered them to Peterson. (Tr. 77.) Peterson paid for the plans.
(Tr. 76.) At no time during the process did Rather have any contact with Nielsen and never
met him prior to trial. Nielsen did not participate in any way in drafting the plans. (Tr. 77.)
Based on the architectural plans, Buck Robinson, the general contractor building the
shell, prepared an estimate for the tenant improvements at the request of Peterson. Nielsen
did not participate in any way in the preparation of the estimate. (Tr. 82.) Robinson
estimated the cost of tenant improvements at $168,047.00. (Tr. 82, Exhibits 14 and 15.)
4

After receiving the bids, Peterson told Nielsen the bids were too high and he could not afford
to construct the interior. (Tr. 20.)
The lease states the lease is for f,the premises" located in Spanish Fork, Utah,
"described as A Strip Mall at 1341 E Center Spanish Fork, UT 84660." (Exhibit 1.) The
parties did not discuss who would pay for the tenant improvements until after the cost
estimates were received. (Tr. 133.) At the time the lease was signed, Nielsen understood
that the lease obligated him to deliver a building shell only. (Tr. 67.) Peterson testified at
trial that his understanding at the time of the lease was that Nielsen was going to pay for the
improvements. (Tr. 101.) There was no testimony concerning any discussion of that issue
prior to receiving the cost estimate.
After discovering that Peterson was anticipating breaching the lease because he could
not afford the tenant improvements, Nielsen started to look for ways to mitigate his potential
damages. (Tr. 50, 54.) Peterson failed to make the payment due November 1, so Nielsen
contacted him and explained that he (Nielsen) needed the payments so he could continue his
payments on the structure. (Tr. 19.) Peterson made excuses to avoid payment (Id.)
When it became evident that Peterson was not going to fulfill his obligations under
the lease, Nielsen proposed a modified lease which lowered the rental amount and provided
that Nielsen would pay $50,000.00 ofthe tenant improvement costs. (Tr. 50,54, Exhibit 13.)
Nielsen prepared this proposed new lease and signed it on January 27,1998. (Tr. 51.) After
Peterson refused to sign, Nielsen entered into a new lease with Jimmy Zufelt, the owner of
5

World's Gym, on February 4,1998. (Tr. 58, Exhibit 17.) Because World's Gym was aware
of Nielsen's financial predicament, Nielsen was required to make substantial concessions
from the terms he had with Peterson, including reducing the rent to 77 cents per square foot,
offering six months free rent, and paying half of the costs of the improvements. (Tr. 25, 56,
58, Exhibit 17.)
Nielsen testified without contradiction that his damagesfrombreach ofthe lease were
at least $112,700.00, consisting of lost rent of $8,500.00 per monthfromNovember, 1997,
through September, 1998 (when World's Gym began making rent payments) and a deficiency
of $800.00 per month thereafter through the remaining term of the Peterson lease. (Tr. 2327, Exhibits 6, 7, 8.) In addition, Nielsen was required to pay utility bills to Spanish Fork
City which should have been paid by Peterson. (Tr. 28, Exhibit 10.) The lease also required
Peterson to pay Nielsen's attorney fees. (Tr. 29, Exhibit 1.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The first focus in determining whether a contractual term is ambiguous must be to
review the entire agreement with a view to harmonizing all its terms. Of the two possible
meanings the trial court ascribed to "the premises," the only one which was internally
consistent with, and which would permit the enforcement of, the entire contract was to equate
"the premises" with the building shell under construction when the lease was signed. The
other potential interpretation, to define "the premises" as including unspecified tenant

6

improvements, would have been too uncertain to be enforced and should have been rejected
as a matter of law.
ARGUMENT
CONSTRUED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH
THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT, THE PHRASE "THE PREMISES"
UNAMBIGUOUSLY REFERRED TO THE BUILDING SHELL ONLY.
The issue presented in this case in is whether the phrase "the premises" in a real estate
lease refers to the premises existing and under construction at the time of the lease, or
whether it refers to premises as yet unplanned and yet unconstructed. For the reasons
explained below, this court should hold that the phrase Mthe premises" must refer to the
premises existing and under construction at the time the lease was signed. Any other
interpretation of the lease would violate established rules of contract construction.
The trial court cited a Black's Dictionary definition of "premises" to assert that it is
"an elastic and inclusive term, and it does not have one definite and fixed meaning." (R. 116
n. 6, citing Blacks [sic] Law Dictionary, 6th ed.)2 While that may be true as a generic
2

The current version of Black's gives the applicable definition of "premises" as "A
house or building, along with its grounds." Black's Law Dictionary 1199 (7th ed. 1999).
One court explained the original meaning of the word "premises" as follows:
We next come to the word "premises." The word in its
legal use originally described the first of the eight parts of a
deed, viz., all which preceded the habendum. The object of this
part of the deed was to rightly name the feoffer and the feoffee,
7

statement, the courts have given the term a fixed meaning in specific contexts. In Deich v.
Reeves, 48 S.E.2d 373, 375 (Ga. 1948), the court held: "While the term 'premises' has
varying meanings, which usually must be determined by the context, yet, when used in a
lease of realty without qualifying words, it has been held by the weight of authority to mean
land and buildings, lands and tenements, land and its appurtenances, etc.M
It is generally held that "[i]n the absence of an express covenant or stipulation binding
him so to do, the landlord is under no obligation to put the demised premises in any particular
condition." Davis v. Stewart 154 P.2d 447,448 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944). "[N]o duty is owed
by a landlord... to prepare the premises for the use of the tenant." Strecker v. Barnard. 240
P.2d 345, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952). "[TJhere is no implied covenant on the part of the
landlord that the demised premises are fit for the purposes for which they are rented or for
the particular use for which they are intended by the tenant..., and this is true even though

and to comprehend the certainty of the lands to be conveyed by
the feoffment. Co. Litt. 6a. It is very easy to see howfromthis
meaning of the word it came to designate the lands. A large part
of the portion of the deed thus named was taken up with the
description of the lands; hence the word "premises," in the latter
part of the deed, was used as meaning the lands only; as, for
instance, "the above-described premises." In this way the word
has come into general use with the meaning "lands," affording
an instance, among many others, of the tendency to use a
general and indefinite word, rather than one of precise and
definite meaning.
Rouse v. Catskill &N.Y. Steam-Boat Co.. 13N.Y.S. 126,128(Super. 1891),a£Td, 133 N.Y.
679, 31 N.E. 623 (1892).
8

the landlord knows the purpose for which the tenant intends to use the premises.'* 51C C.J.S.
Landlord & Tenant § 304.
As the trial court correctly noted, there must be a meeting of the minds in order for
there to be an enforceable contract. Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern. 928 P.2d 368,
373 (Utah 1996). But, because it would be so easy after the fact to adjust testimony to what
each party then wanted the result to be,3 the determination of whether there has been a
meeting of the minds must follow established rules. The court must to look at what the
parties said and did, not what each privately thought. Allen v. Bissinger & Co., 62 Utah 226,
219 P. 539,541-42 (1923) (the law "judges of his intentions by his outward expressions and
excludes all questions in regard to his unexpressed intention. If his words or acts, judged by
a reasonable standard, manifest an intention to agree to the matter in question, that agreement
is established, and it is immaterial what may be the real but unexpressed state of his mind
upon the subject.M); Jaramillo v. Farmers Ins. Group. 669 P.2d 1231, 1233 (Utah 1993)

3

For example, Peterson claimed at trial that he did not intend the lease to be binding and
that he had no authority to sign a lease for Golds Gym. (Tr. 99-103.) The trial court properly
recognized this as testimony created after the fact:
For someone who had no authority, and for someone who
believed he was under no contract obligation, Peterson did some
strange things. He signed a lease, advertised the opening of the
premises by mailing fliers to county residents, and spent $3,000
on specialized architectural plans. His actions suggest that even
he believed that a deal had been reached.
(R. 117.)
9

("Unexpressed intentions do not affect the validity of a contract."); Hotel Riviera. Inc. v.
Torres. 632 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Nev. 1981) ("The making of a contract depends not on the
agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of external signsnot on the parties' having meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing.")
(citation omitted, italics in original).
A related rule is that a party will not be permitted to contradict the unambiguous terms
of a document. "A contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one
reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other
facial deficiencies." Interwest Construction v. Palmer. 923 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah 1996)
(citations and quotation marks omitted). The determination of whether a document is
ambiguous is a question of law for the court. RL, 923 P.2d at 1358 (Utah 1996). "When
determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered."
Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Association. 907 P.2d 264,268 (Utah 1995). The evidence
must, however, have been in existence at the time the document was signed. Year gin. Inc.
v. Auditing Division. 2001 UT 11,ffif39, 42, 20 P.3d 287.
The court should first determine whether the meaning of the term can be ascertained
from the four corners of the document. Central Florida Investments. Inc. v. Parkwest
Associates. 2002 UT 3, % 12 (citation omitted). "Where questions arise in the interpretation
of an agreement, the first source of inquiry is within the document itself. It should be looked
at in its entirety and in accordance with its purpose. All of its parts should be given effect
10

insofar as that is possible." Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch. 955 P.2d 357,363 (Utah Ct. App.
1998) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In making this determination, the court should
adopt a construction which will give effect to the whole document and not result in defeating
the validity of the document. Central Florida Investments, supra; Engle v. First National
BankofChuewater. 590 P.2d 826,831 (Wyo. 1979) ("The law does not favor the destruction
of contracts on the ground of indefiniteness, and if it be feasible the court will so construe
the agreement so as to carry into effect the reasonable intention of the parties if that can be
ascertained.").
Here, the post-contract testimony of the parties concerning their unexpressed
intentions at the time of contract was at odds. Nielsen testified his understanding when he
and Peterson each signed the Commercial Lease was that Nielsen's obligation was only to
provide the building shell which was then under construction. Peterson testified his
understanding was that Nielsen was going to pay for additional improvements. Viewed in
the light of the principles of contract construction restated above, however, this "conflict" in
the evidence did not prevent enforcement of the lease.4 The trial court erred in treating this
case as presenting a factual dispute, because the principles on contract construction resolve
the issue as one of law.

4

As the trial court properly recognized, "improvements were not even discussed until well
after the contract had been signed. This fact precludes the possibility that some oral
understanding was reached at the time of contract execution as to payment for the
improvements." (R. 115.)
11

A review of the four corners of the document in light of established law permits only
the conclusion that Mthe premises" meant the building shell which was existing and under
construction at the time the document was signed. The only "premises" in existence at the
time the lease was signed consisted of the building shell. At the time the lease was signed,
"the premises" could have only referred to what was there. Although the shell was not yet
completed, there was a contract in place for the construction of the shell and the work was
in progress. Any uncertainty as to what constituted the building shell could have been
resolved by reviewing the construction contract.
In contrast, defining "the premises" to include improvements would result in an
unenforceable contract. On August 17, 1997, when the lease was signed, the anticipated
tenant improvements had not even been designed. A contract is not enforceable unless its
terms are reasonably certain. One of the fundamental requirements for the enforceability of
a contract is that its terms be certain enough to provide the basis for giving an appropriate
remedy. Candland v. Oldrovd. 67 Utah 605, 609, 248 P. 1101, 1103 (1926). If this
minimum standard of certainty is not met, there is no contract at all. Brown's Shoe Fit Co.
v. Olch. 955 P.2d 357, 365 n .8 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted).
Had "the premises" included an obligation to construct tenant improvements, there
would have been no way to determine with any certainty what improvements should be
installed. Although the trial court was concerned that the dollar cost of the tenant
improvements was such a large item that one would have expected the lease to assign
12

responsibility for those improvements, it would be even more implausible to imagine that the
parties intended Peterson to have a blank check obligating Nielsen to construct whatever
improvements Peterson happened to want. The cost of the improvements would have
consumed more than half of the total rents over the three-year term of the lease. Conversely,
iftenant improvements were part ofthe contract, one cannot imagine Peterson being satisfied
with Nielsen constructing only those improvements which Nielsen wanted to pay for.
It is evident from the trial court's ruling that the court found the parties intended to be
bound by the lease agreement.5 In determining what that agreement was, the court is
required to adopt a construction which will make the contract enforceable, and to reject a
construction which will defeat enforceability. The only construction of the contract which
satisfies this rule is to define "the premises" to mean the shell which was under construction
at the time the contract was signed.
The trial court was concerned that "the cost ofthe improvements, $ 168,000, is so large
that no reasonable person can believe the parties reached an enforceable agreement on all
essential lease terms without the contract containing a clear statement as to who would bear
that expense." (R. 116.) The trial court's concern for Peterson violates this Court's policy
to not paternalistically interfere with the freedom of contract. "It is a long-standing rule in
Utah that persons dealing at arm's length are entitled to contract on their own terms without

5

"[Peterson's] actions suggest that even he believed that a deal had been reached." (R.
117.)
13

the intervention of the courts to relieve either party from the effects of a bad bargain." Hal
Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982). If Peterson really
expected Nielsen to provide tenant improvements according to Peterson's subsequent design
and whim, it certainly would have been prudent for Peterson to state that in the contract
addendum. In light of the rule that a landlord has no responsibility to provide any
improvements for the tenant, however, it was error for the trial court to hold the contract
unenforceable merely because it imprudently failed to spell out everything the law implied.
The trial court also gave undue emphasis to the contract provision (Ex. 1, 1 3)
requiring the tenant to repair "electrical wiring, plumbing and heating installations and any
other system or equipment upon the premises" and to return them "in as good condition as
received, normal wear and tear excepted." The trial court opined that this indicated it was
Nielsen's obligation to provide improvements. (R. 116n. 5.) The same paragraph, however,
also requires the tenant to maintain the "plate glass" but there was no evidence of any plate
glass installed or contemplated. Under the trial court's reading of paragraph 3, the landlord
would be required to provide plate glass just so the tenant could maintain it. The proper
interpretation of paragraph 3 is that the tenant was required to maintain any such
improvements "received." It did not impose on the landlord any obligation to provide the
specified improvements. In fact, paragraph 4 of the contract contemplates the tenant will
install improvements, after obtaining the landlord's consent.

14

Contract construction rules required the trial court to look first at what the parties
actually said and signed, and to determine the meaning of the contractfroma review of the
entire document. Because interpreting the document to require the landlord to install
unspecified improvements would void the contract for uncertainty, the court was required
to reject that potential interpretation. The only reasonable interpretation was that the lease
was for the premises existing and under construction at the time it was signed. The contract
was enforceable, and Nielsen was entitled to damages for Peterson's breach of the contract.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's conclusion that there was no contract should be reversed. Because
Peterson never contradicted the damages claimed by Nielsen, the case should be remanded
with instructions to enter judgment for Nielsen for the damages proved at trial.
DATED this J ^ f day of March, 2002.

DON R. PETERSEN and
Q
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this _i^Tday of March, 2002.
Brian C. Harrison
3651 North 100 East, Suite 300
Provo, UT 84604
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APPENDIX "A"
RULING (R. 120-113)

FILED o
Fourth Judicial District! *<
of Utah County, State of Utah
^eputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAMES D. NIELSEN,

CASE NUMBER: 980405353

Plaintiff
DATED: JANUARY 24,2001
vs.
RULING
GOLDS GYM and TROY
PETERSON & ASSOCIATES,

ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE

Defendants.

This matter came to trial on December 12,2000, on plaintiffs complaint for
breach of contract. I now issue this ruling,findingthat plaintiff has not sustained
his burden in this case.
FACTUAL FINDINGS
Ifindthat the following facts have been proven by a preponderance of the
evidence:
1. Sometime before August 18,1997, Golds Gym manager Troy Peterson
(Peterson) approached James Nielsen (Nielsen) about the possibility of leasing
property that had been advertised for rent.

2. On August 18, 1997, Peterson and Nielsen signed a document entitled
"Commercial Lease" which provides that the lessor Nielsen leases to "Golds Gym
& Troy Peterson & Associates" "the premises" located in a "Strip Mall at 1341
East Center Spanish Fork, UT 84660" for $0.85* per square foot per month for
three years. At the time of signing, the strip mall was undergoing construction.
3. At the time the document was signed, the subject property was zoned
CI, a classification that did not allow for the operation of a health club and gym.
4. Shortly after it was executed, the signed lease was provided to the city
zoning commission which granted a zoning change that would accommodate the
operation of a gym on the premises.
5. In September 1997, Peterson hadflyersprinted up and mailed
throughout the community announcing the opening of a new Golds Gym. The flyer
indicated the new gym would be located at the strip mall described above and
would be open in November 1997.
6. Peterson met twice with John Rather, an architect, who drew up plans
for interior improvements according to Peterson's specifications. Peterson paid
John Rather for these plans.
7. The architectural plans were submitted to Buck Robinson of KBR
construction who gave a cost estimate for the proposed improvements.
8. A dispute then arose over who would pay for the tenant improvements.

1

The contract actually says .85 cents. This is merely a typographical error and the
contract should be reformed to say $0.85.
2

Each party wanted the other to pay the entire cost of the improvements. Sometime
later, Nielsen offered to pay half of the improvements, but Peterson refused.
9. As a result of this dispute, Golds Gym never moved into the premises
and paid nothing to Nielsen.
10. When Golds Gym neither moved in nor paid for the lease space, Nielsen
sent a notice terminating the lease.
11. Thereafter Nielsen and Peterson continued to negotiate concerning a
possible lease of the premises by Golds Gym.
12. Nielsen eventually rented the subject premises to another entity at a
price of $0.77 a square foot, with six monthsfreerent, and after paying for half of
the tenant improvements.
13. Nielsen now seeks expectation damages against Golds Gym based on
the terms of the August 18,1997 Commercial Lease.
14. Peterson claims he is not authorized to bind Golds Gym to a contract as
Golds Gym is a dba of a Utah corporation, Sports Fitness, Inc., and Peterson claims
not to be authorized by Sports Fitness, Inc. to enter into contracts on its behalf.
Though there may be merit to this claim, Peterson never made this point with
Nielsen during any of the negotiations for the premises.
ANALYSIS AND RULING
Nielsen asserts that the August 18,1997 lease is an enforceable contract. In
contrast, Peterson maintains that the lease was drawn up and signed only under the
express understanding that no contract was being formed, and that the signed
3

document only would be used to encourage government authorities to change the
zoning of the property. He claims that the terms of the lease represent preliminary
negotiations which would take official shape at a later time since he had no
authority to act on Golds Gym's behalf (Sports Fitness, Inc.).
For someone who had no authority, and for someone who believed he was
under no contract obligation, Peterson did some strange things. He signed a lease,
advertised the opening of the premises by mailing fliers to county residents, and
spent $3,000 on specialized architectural plans. His actions suggest that even he
believed that a deal had been reached.2 However, the Commercial Lease is
nonetheless unenforceable for lack of mutual assent, or a meeting of the minds, as
to the nature and extent of the property to be leased.
A condition precedent to the enforcement of any contract is the mutual
assent to every material term and condition set forth in the offer.3 In a contract to
lease realty, the material terms are price, duration, and the extent and boundary of
the property. See Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 242 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah
2

See Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d29, 36-37 (Utah App. 1993)
(subsequent acts determine whether parties intended to be bound by a lease agreement for real
property - defendant intended to be bound since it entered the premises, made rental payments,
hired an architect and contractor, and engaged in demolition).
3

Mutual assent is fundamental to every enforceable contract. It means that each party
has "a definite, understandable, and unequivocal meeting of the minds upon the terms of the
contract; that is to say, each party must agree without reservation to what he is required to do and
to what the other party is required and expected to do." Candlandv. Oldroyd, 248 P. 1101,1102
(Utah 1926). See Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City ofSt George, 898 P.2d 1372,1376 (Utah
1995) (plaintiff must show '*the parties1 mutual assent as to all material terms and conditions");
Commercial Union Assocs., 863 P.2d at 36-37 ("A condition precedent to the enforcement of
any contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be spelled out,
either expressly or implicitly, with sufficient definiteness to be enforced.").
4

1952) (internal citation omitted).4 To prevail, the plaintiff must show a meeting of
the minds on each of these terms. See Cal Wadsworth Comtr. v. City of St
George, 898 P.2d 1372,1376 (Utah 1995) (plaintiff bears burden).
In this case, Nielsen has failed to establish that there was an understanding
and agreement as to the extent and boundary of the property. According to
Nielsen, the lease only obligates him to provide Peterson with a shell, not
improvements while Peterson claimed that Nielsen was responsible to pay for the
improvements.5 However, the lease document itself is utterly silent on the topic of
payment for the improvements. Yet the cost of the improvements, $168,000, is so
large that no reasonable person can believe the parties reached an enforceable
agreement on all essential lease terms without the contract containing a clear
statement as to who would bear that expense.6

4

The court states that these are the essential terms of a contract to lease real property,
although the case actually deals with the statute of frauds.
5

If anything, the document hints that it is Nielsen's obligation to pay and provide for the
improvements. In paragraph three entitled "Care and Maintenance of Premises," the lessee is
under an obligation to care for improvements and surrender "the same... in as good condition as
received, normal wear and tear excepted/' Why have a provision in the lease that requires the
lessee to return improvements "as received"? This suggests that the improvements were to be
provided by Nielsen as part of the premises.
6

Nielsen also argues that the lease describes the property as 'the premises," and that
"the premises" meant the space as it was at the time of the lease execution-in its unimproved
state. In feet, however, a description of property is ambiguous if "the words used may be
understood to support two or more plausible meanings." Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d
57,60 (Utah App. 1990). It is plausible that '^premises" could mean a mere shell, or, a finished
building, especially where construction of the premises was still in progress when the contract
was executed: "Premises is an elastic and inclusive term, and it does not have one definite and
fixed meaning; its meaning is to be determined by its context and is dependent on circumstances
in which used, and may mean a room, shop, building, or any definite area." Blacks Law
Dictionary, 6th ed.
5

Nor does extrinsic evidence establish the necessary assent. In this case
each party conceded that improvements were not even discussed until well after the
contract had been signed. This fact precludes the possibility that some oral
understanding was reached at the time of contract execution as to payment for the
improvements. Instead, Nielsen argues that Peterson's obligations stem from
industry custom.8 He claims that absent an express provision to the contrary,
commercial lessors only provide shells, and commercial lessees always install and
pay for the improvements.9 He further argues that Peterson must have been aware
of this practice, or that he was otherwise aware of his obligation to pay for the
improvements, since Peterson paid for the architectural plans. He therefore asks
that the court hold Peterson to the industry standard.
However, Nielsen presented no evidence that such an industry standard
exists. Nor does it necessarily follow from Peterson's payment of a few thousand

7

Nielsen insists that the contract is integrated and that no extrinsic evidence ishould be
considered. But, having found the contract insufficient, I also look to the extrinsic evidence to
determine whether that evidence will clariiy the issue which the contract leaves indefinite. In that
setting, I note that when a contract for the sale or lease of land contains a property des cription
that is susceptible to different meanings, extrinsic evidence is admissible to remove indefiniteness
and to prove that the parties contemplated a specific meaning over another: "when a contract is
ambiguous, because of the uncertain meaning of terms, missing terms, or other facial
deficiencies, parol evidence is admissible to explain the parties' intent." Faulkner v. Farnsworth,
665 P.2d 1292,1293 (Utah 1983); see also Dixon, 987 P.2d at 57 C\If\ provision is gimbiguous
. . . [e]xtrinsic evidence is therefore necessary to ascertain the parties' intentions."). Thus, if it is
available, reference to extrinsic evidence is appropriate in this case.
8

This position is quite strange, since this argument-trade usage or custom-is wholly
dependent on extrinsic evidence, which Nielsen claimed the court should not consider.
9

Nielsen argued at trial that in order for the lessor to be responsible for improvements,
that feet must be "put on the contract." There is no unambiguous legal authority supporting this
claim.

6

dollars on customized architectural plans that he obligated himself to the entire
$168,000 in improvement costs. How those costs were to be apportioned was not
addressed in the written agreement nor in any oral understandings of the parties.10
Simply put, Nielsen has failed to prove that there was a meeting of the minds-a
mutual understanding-as to the essential, material term of which party was to pay
for the tenant improvements. Without understanding and agreement as to that
term, Nielsen's claim that there is an enforceable agreement fails. The contract is
unenforceable for lack of mutual assent.
CONCLUSION
Nielsen is not entitled to expectation damages based on the lease document.
Pursuant to rule 4-504 Code of Judicial Administration, defendants' counsel is
directed to preparefindingsof fact, conclusions of law and a judgment of dismissal
of the action.
Dated this 23L day of Januaiy, 2001.

BY THE COURT:

ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELOrW^E

^
10

.

V

A*

While Peterson's payment for the plans has evidential valn^fiWge measure that
value was more than neutralized when Buck Robinson of KBR Construction testified that Nielsen
told him no agreement had yet been reached with respect to the interior improvements.
7
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APPENDIX "B
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (R. 148-143)
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BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C.
Brian C. Harrison (#1388)
Attorney for Defendants
3651 North 100 East, Suite 300
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-7700

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES D. NIELSEN,
Plaintiff,

]I
I

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

-vsGOLD'S GYM and TROY PETERSON, ]
& ASSOCIATES,
]
Defendants.

Civil No. 980405353
JUDGE Anthony W. Schofiel<
DIVISION NO. 10

This matter come to trial on December 12, 2000, Plaintiff
being present and represented by his attorney, Don R. Petersen, and
the Defendants being present and represented by his attorney, Brian
C. Harrison, and the court having considered the argument of
counsel and being fully advised in the premises, now enters its:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Sometime before August 18, 1997, Gold's Gym manager, Troy

Peterson (Peterson) approached James Nielsen (Nielsen) about the
possibility of leasing property that had been advertised for rent.
2.

On

August

18,

1997, Peterson

and

Nielsen

signed

a

document entitled "Commercial Lease" which provides that the lessor
Nielsen leases to "Gold's Gym & Troy Peterson & Associates" "the
premises" located in a "Strip Mall at 1341 East Center, Spanish
Fork, Utah 84660" for $0.851 per square foot per month for three
years.

At the time of signing, the strip mall was undergoing

construction.
3.

At the time the document was signed, the subject property

was zoned CI, a classification that did not allow for the operation
of a health club and gym.
4.

Shortly

provided
change

after it was executed,

the signed lease was

to the city zoning commission which granted a zoning

that would

accommodate

the operation

of

a gym on

premises.

x

The contract actually says .85 cents. This is merely a
typographical error and the contract should be reformed to say
$0.85.
2

the

5.

In September 1997, Peterson had flyers printed up and

mailed throughout the community announcing the opening of a new
Gold's Gym.

The flyer indicated the new gym would be located in

the strip mall described above and would be open in November 1997.
6.

Peterson met twice with John Rather/ an architect, who

drew up plans for interior improvements according to Peterson's
specifications.
7.

Peterson paid John Rather for these plans.

The architectural plans were submitted to Buck Robinson

of KBR construction who gave a cost estimate for the proposed
improvements.
8.

A dispute then arose over who would pay for the tenant

improvements.

Each party wanted the other to pay the entire cost

of the improvements.

Sometime later, Nielsen offered to pay half

of the improvements, but Peterson refused.
9.

As a result of this dispute, Gold's Gym never moved into

the premises and paid nothing to Nielsen.
10.

When Gold's Gym neither moved in nor paid for the lease

space, Nielsen sent a notice terminating the lease.
11.

Thereafter Nielsen and Peterson continued to negotiate

concerning a possible lease of the premises by Gold's Gym.

3
i A :?

12.

Nielsen eventually rented the subject premises to another

entity at a price of $0.11

a square foot, with six months rent

free, and after paying a half of the tenant improvements.
13.

Nielsen now seeks expectation damages against Gold's Gym

based on the terms of the August 18, 1997 Commercial Lease.
14.

Peterson claims he is not authorized to bind Gold's Gym

to a contract as Gold's Gym is a dba of a Utah corporation, Sports
Fitness, Inc., and Peterson claims not be authorized by Sports
Fitness, Inc. to enter into contract on its behalf.

Though there

may be a merit to this claim, Peterson never made this point with
Nielsen during any of the negotiations for the premises.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Commercial Lease is unenforceable for lack of mutual

assent, or a meeting of the minds, as to the nature and extent

of

the property to be leased.
2.

Nielsen

has

failed

to

establish

that

there

was

an

understanding and agreement as to the extent and boundary of the
property.

4

3.

Nielsen has failed to prove that there was a meeting of

the minds - a mutual understanding- as to the essential, material
term of which party was to pay for the tenant improvements.
4.

This matter is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

DATED this

\\

day of

(Ufllf

Approved as to Form:

Don R. Petersen

5

^J^OOl.

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true cind correct
copy of the foregoing on this

1

day of

3^40.

, 2 0 01,

by first-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following:

Don R. Petersen
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603

6

APPENDIX "C"

JlJDCiMI-NTOF DISMISSAL (R. 151-149)
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BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C.
Brian C. Harrison (#1388)
Attorney for Defendants
3651 North 100 East, Suite 300
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-7700

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JAMES D. NIELSEN,
Plaintiff,
>

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL

-vsGOLD'S GYM, and TROY PETERSON, ]
& ASSOCIATES,
]
Defendants.

1
1
1

Civil No. 980405353
JUDGE Anthony W. Schofiel<
DIVISION NO. 10

This matter come to trial on December 12, 2000, Plaintiff
being present and represented by his attorney, Don R* Petersen, and
the Defendants being present and represented by his attorney, Brian
C, Harrison,

and

the court having

considered

the argument

of

counsel and being fully advised in the premises, and the Court
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

1.

The Commercial Lease is unenforceable for lack of mutual

assent, or a meeting of the minds, as to the nature and extent of
the property to be leased.
2.

Nielsen has failed to establish

that there was an

understanding and agreement as to the extent and boundary of the
property.
3.

Nielsen has failed to prove that there was a meeting of

the minds - a mutual understanding- as to the essential, material
term of which party was to pay for the tenant improvements.
4.

This matter is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

DATED this

jl

day of

JUu

, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

Approved as to Form:

Don R. Petersen

2

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing on this

jA^

day of

J~r{Jjf\_

/ 2001,

by first-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following:

Don R. Petersen
120 East 300 North
P.O, Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603

Secupetary
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COMMERCIAL LEASE (EXHIBIT
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COMMERCIAL LEASE

R140-04

This lease is made between

James

D#

N i e l g e n

of 963 East Crosswinds Dr. Spanish Fork, UT 84660
herein called Lessor, and Golds Gym & Troy P e t e r s o n & A s s o c i a t e s Both as a
>0f
Company & i n d i v i d u a l of 1735 N S t a t e ST. Provo, UT 84606 , herein called Lessee.
Lessee hereby offers to leasefromLessor the premises situated in the City of Spanish Fork
.Countyof Utah
.Stateof Utah
.describedas
A S t r i p Mall a t 1341 E Center Spanish Fork, UT 84660
, upon the following TERMS and CONDITIONS:
1. Term and Rent Lessor demises the above premises for a term of
3
years, commencing
Nov 1
,19 97
, and terminating on
Oct. 31
,318 2000 , or sooner as
provided herein at the annual rental of . 8 5 0 per Sq F t . per month f o r t h e f i r s t 3 y e a r s
Year
Bftftaffiff
Year ? s
) , payable in equal installments in advance on the
first day of each month for that month's rental, during the term of this lease. All rental payments shall be made to
Lessor, at the address specified above.
2. Use. Lessee shall use and occupy the premises for
Health Club & Gym.
lie premises shall be used for no other purpose. Lessor represents that the premises may lawfully be usecvfar such purpose.
3. Care and Maintenance of Premises. Lessee acknowledges that the premises are in good order and repair,
unless otherwise indicated herein. Lessee shall, at his own expense and at all times, maintain the premises in good
and safe condition, including plate glass, electrical wiring, plumbing and heating installations and any other system
or equipment upon the premises and shall surrender the same, at termination hereof, in as good condition as
received, normal wear and tear excepted. Lessee shall be responsible for all repairs required, excepting the roof,
exterior walls, structural foundations, and:
Snow removal & Landscaping m a i n t a n c e .
, which
shall be maintained by Lessor. Lessee shall also maintain in good condition such portions adjacent to the premises,
such as sidewalks, driveways, lawns and shrubbery, which would otherwise be required to be maintained by Lessor.
4. Alterations. Lessee shall not, without first obtaining the written consent of Lessor, make any alterations, additions, or improvements, in, to or about the premises.
5. Ordinances and Statutes. Lessee shall comply with all statutes, ordinances and requirements of all municipal,
state and federal authorities now in force, or which may hereafter be in force, pertaining to the premises, occasioned
by or affecting the use thereof by Lessee.
6. Assignment and Subletting. Lessee shall not assign this lease or sublet any portion of the premises without
prior written consent of the Lessor, which shall not be unreasonably withheld. Any such assignment or subletting
without consent shall be void and, at the option of the Lessor, may terminate this lease.
7. Utilities. All applications and connections for necessary utility services on the demised premises shall be made
in the name of Lessee only, and L e w $h«" b* solely liable for utility chcrges as iaey become due, including those
for sewer, water, gas, electricity, and telephone services.
8. Entry and Inspection. Lessee shall permit Lessor or Lessor's agents to enter upon the premises at reasonable
times and upon reasonable notice, for the purpose of inspecting the same, and will permit Lessor at any time within
sixty (60) days prior to the expiration of this lease, to place upon the premises any u«ual 'To Let" or "For Lease"
signs, and permit persons desiring to lease the same to inspect the premises thereafter.
9. Possession. If Lessor is unable to deliver possession of the premises at lhe commencement hereof. Lessor shall
not be liable for any damage caused thereby, nor shall this lease be void or voidable, but Lessee shall not be liable
for any rent until possession is delivered. Lessee may terminate this lease if possession is not delivered within
days of the commencement of the term hereof.
10. Indemnification of Lessor. Lessor shall not be liable for any damage or injury to Lessee, or any other p-rron,
or to any property, occurring on the demised premises or any part thereof, and Lessee agrees to hold Lessor harmless from any claims for damages, no matter how caused.
11. Insurance. Lessee, at his expense, shall maintain plate glass and public liability insurance including bodily
injury and property damage insuring Lessee and Lessor with minimum coverage as follows:
Lessee shall provide Lessor with a Certificate of Insurance showing Lessor as additional insured. The
Certificate shall provide for a ten-day written notice to Lessor in the event of cancellation or material change of coverage. To the maximum extent permitted by insurance policies which may be owned by Lessor or Lessee, Lessee
and Lessor, for the benefit of each other, waive any and allrightsof subrogation which might otherwise exist.
NOTICE: Contact your local county real estate board or Association of Realtors* for additional
forms that may be required to meet youi specific needs.
m n

Hern i / II i n n n n l

Page 1 Of 2

(Revlied 9/96)

12. Eminent Domain. If the premises or any part thereof or any estate therein, or any other part of the building materially affecting Lessee's use of the premises, shall be taken by eminent domain, this lease shall terminate on the date when title vests pursuant
to such taking. The rent, and any additional rent, shall be apportioned as of the termination date, and any rent paid for any period
beyond that date shall be repaid to Lessee. Lessee shall not be entitled to any part of the award for such taking or any payment in
lieu thereof, but Lessee may Hie a claim for any taking of fixtures and improvements owned by Lessee, and for moving expenses.
13. Destruction of Premises. In the event of a partial destruction of the premises during the term hereof, from any cause, Lessor
shall forthwith repair the same, provided that such repairs can be made within sixty (60) days under existing governmental laws
and regulations, but such partial destruction shall not terminate this lease, except that Lessee shall be entitled to a proportionate
reduction of rent while such repairs are being made, based upon the extent to which the making of such repairs shall interfere with
the business of Lessee on the premises. If such repairs cannot be made within said sixty (60) days, Lessor, at his option, may
make the same within a reasonable time, this lease continuing in effect with the rent proportionately abated as aforesaid, and in the
event that Lessor shall not elect to make such repairs which cannot be made within sixty (60) days, this lease may be terminated at
the option of either party. In the event that the building in which the demised premises may be situated is destroyed to an extent of
not less than one-third of the replacement costs thereof, Lessor may elect to terminate this lease whether the demised premises be
injured or not. A total destruction of the building in which the premises may be situated shall terminate this lease
14. Lessor's Remedies on Default If Lessee defaults in the payment of rent, or any additional rent, or defaults in the performance of any of the other covenants or conditions hereof, Lessor may give Lessee notice of such default and if Lessee does not
cure any such default within
30
days, after the giving of such notice (or if such other default is of such nature that it
cannot be completely cured within such period, if Lessee does not commence such curing within such 30
days and thereafter
proceed with reasonable diligence and in good faith to cure such default), then Lessor may terminate this lease on not less than
days' notice to Lessee. On the date specified in such notice the term of this lease shall terminate, and Lessee shall then
quit and surrender the premises to Lessor, but Lessee shall remain liable as hereinafter provided. If this lease shall have been so
terminated by Lessor, Lessor may at any time thereafter resume possession of the premises by any lawful means and remove
Lessee or other occupants and their effects. No failure to enforce any term shall be deemed a waiver.
15. Security Deposit. Lessee shall deposit with Lessor on the signing of this lease the sum of $ 1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 & F i r s t
month l e a s e i n advance
One Thousand
Dollars ($
) as security for the
performance of Lessee's obligations under this lease, including without limitation the surrender of possession of the premises to
Lessor as herein provided. If Lessor applies any part of the deposit to cure any default of Lessee, Lessee shall on demand deposit
with Lessor the amount so applied so that Lessor shall have the full deposit on hand at all times during the term of this lease.
16. Tax Increase. In the event there is any increase during any year of the term of this lease in the City, County or State real estate
taxes over and above the amount of such taxes assessed for the tax year during which the term of this lease commences, whether
because of increased rate or valuation, Lessee shall pay to Lessor upon presentation of paid tax bills an amount equal to
%
of the increase in taxes upon the land and building in which the leased premises are situated. In the event that such taxes are
assessed for a tax year extending beyond the term of the lease, the obligation of Lessee shall be proportionate to the portion of the
lease term included in such year.
17. Common Area Expenses. In the event the demised premises are situated in a shopping center or in a commercial building in
which there are common areas, Lessee agrees to pay his pro-rata share of maintenance, taxes, and insurance for the common area.
18. Attorney's Fees. In case suit should be brought for recovery of the premises, or for any sum due hereunder, or because of any
act which may arise out of the possession of the premises, by either party, the prevailing party shall be entitled to all costs incurred
in connection with such action, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
19. Waiver. No failure of Lessor to enforce any term hereof shall be deemed to be a waiver.
20. Notices. Any notice which either party may or is required to give, shall be given by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to Lessee at
the premises, or Lessor at the address specified above, or at such other places as may be designated by the partiesfromtine to time.
21. Heirs, Assigns, Successors. This lease is binding upon and inures to the benefit of the heirs, assigns and successors in interest
to the parties.
22. Option to Renew. Provided that Lessee is not in default in the performance of this lease, Lessee shall have the option to
renew the lease for an additional term of 60
months commencing at the expiration of the initial lease term. All of the
terms and conditions of the lease shall apply during the renewal term except that the monthly rent shall be the sum gfjfic
To Be
The option shall be exercised by written notice given to Lessor not less than 90
days prior to the expiration of the
initial lease term. If notice is not given in the manner provided herein within the time specified, this option shall expire.
23. Subordination. This lease is and shall be subordinated to all existing and future liens and encumbrances against the property.
24. Radon Gas Disclosure. As required by law, (Landlord) (Seller) makes the following disclosure: "Radon Gas" is a naturally
occurring radioactive gas that, when it has accumulated in a building in sufficient quantities, may present healthrisksto persons who
are exposed to it over time. Levels of radon that exceed federal and state guidelines have been found in buildings in
Additional information regarding radon and radon testing may bevobtainedfromyour county public health unit
25. Entire Agreement. The foregoing constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and may be modified only by a writing
signed by both partie*. The following Exhibits, if any, have been made a part of this lease before the parties, execution hereof:
Signed this

(jfW&yof

August

,19 97

*y:
Lessor
O E-Z LcgaTVormf. Before you use this form, read It, fill in all blacks, and make whatever changes are necessary to your particular transaction Cbnsnit a lawyer if you doubt the fern's

Addendum To Commercial Lease dated

^/

/

August 1997

1. Subject to the lessor being able to getting approval from Spanish Fork City rezoning
the propertyfromthe current C-l zoning to C-2 zone.
2. Annual prepaid rents to be $.85 per square ft per month if over 10,000 square feet are
leased annually, otherwise the rent is to be $1.00 per square foot per month.
3. This is to be a three year lease to have afiveyear option on lease after three years.
4. Lessor to pay property tax on building.
5. First months lease to be paid only when rezoning is complete.

